State v. Christian3/9/2004
and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blumenthal v. Kimber Mfg., Inc., 265 Conn. 1, 7, 826 A.2d 1088 (2003). In the present case, the trial court's determination that the marital communications privilege does not apply to existent marriages that irretrievably have broken down was a conclusion of law. Thus, our limited task, in connection with the first prong of the test, is to decide whether, based on the facts set forth in the record, the trial court's conclusion of law was legally and logically correct. See id.
For the marital communications privilege to apply, the communications must have been made in confidence during the marriage. Once the marital communications privilege has attached, moreover, it continues to survive even after the marriage has ended. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6, 74 S. Ct. 358, 98 L. Ed. 435 (1954) ("divorce . . . does not terminate the privilege for confidential marital communications"); see also 1 C. McCormick, supra, § 85, p. 339 ("about one-half of the statutes codifying the [marital communications] privilege explicitly provide that it continues after death or divorce"); C. Tait, supra, § 5.35.4, p. 330 (marital communications privilege continues after divorce and death of spouse). In other words, the privilege focuses on the marital relationship between the spouses at the time that the communication was made, and not at the time of trial.
As we have noted, the marital communications privilege was founded upon the strong policy of preserving the marital relationship through the fostering of confidences between spouses. This policy applies with equal force to preserve all legally valid marriages, irrespective of marital difficulties. "Indeed, the reasons justifying the marital communications privilege--encourag marital partners to share their most closely guarded secrets and thoughts, thus adding an additional measure of intimacy and mutual support to the marriage--apply with equal force to married couples who, despite the appearance to outsiders of an irretrievably broken marriage, may still share hopes of reconciliation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blazek v. Superior Court, 177 Ariz. 535, 539-40, 869 P.2d 509 (App. 1994). We conclude, therefore, that the marital communications privilege applies to the present case.
Although the defendant's marriage may have been acrimonious at the time that he had made the communications to his wife, the marital communications privilege nonetheless was valid. Furthermore, because the focus is on the status of the marital relationship at the time of the communication, their marital status at the time of trial was immaterial. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant's communications to his wife, made while the couple was living together as husband and wife, were subject to the marital communications privilege insofar as those communications were confidential.
Wenext focus our analysis on the question of whether the communications were confidential. The state contends that the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion in limine can be affirmed, nevertheless, because the marital communications were not confidential. Specifically, the state relies on the defendant's previous, similar statements to Vorih, Ruggerio and Ford. We disagree.
We note, at the outset, that the determination of the second factor, that is, whether a communication was confidential, depends on the facts of the particular case. It is axiomatic that the marital communications privilege protects only those communications that are confidential. Wolfle v. United States, supra, 291 U.S. 14. "Although marital communications
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